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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BILLS OF ATTAINDER-LEGISLATIVE DENIAL OF
SALARY APPROPRIATION-Plaintiff, a civil service employee of the Minnesota
Department of Conservation, had held the position of Assistant Director
of Game and Fish since its creation. In 1953 the legislature enacted an
appropriations bill which included a provision that: "Of the amounts appropriated for salaries . . . no part shall be used to pay the salary of an
Assistant Director of Game and Fish."1 Plaintiff brought an action for a
declaratory judgment against his immediate superior, contending that the
rider was void. He introduced evidence to show that he had incurred the
enmity of certain members of the legislature and that this seemingly
prompted the passage of the rider. The trial court ruled that the rider
fell within the federal and state constitutional prohibitions of bills of
attainder.2 On appeal, held, reversed. The provision was simply a refusal
of an appropriation for the salary of a certain office. It was not a bill of
attainder since there was no evidence sufficient to show that the legislature
intended this provision as punishment for a crime or some other act adjudged worthy of penalty. Starkweather v. Blair, (Minn. 1955) 71 N.W.
(2d) 869.
A bill of attainder is commonly defined as "a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without a judicial trial." 3 An inherent feature of these bills
is the intention of the legislature that someone be punished for a particular
act. Since most bill of attainder cases have involved the validity of loyalty
oaths,4 there is little precedent for the problem of legislative discharge of
government employees.5 The leading decision in this area, and one strikingly similar to the principal case, ii; United States v. Lovett6 which inMinn. Laws (1953) c. 741, §38, p. 1013.
U.S. CONST., art. I, §10; MINN. CONST., art. I, §11.
Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 277 at 323 (1866). See also Ex parte
Garland, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 333 (1866). These cases also settled the point that the char•
acter of a bill of attainder is not altered by a failure to name a person, as long as it pro•
vides a means of ascertaining his identity.
Technically, a bill of attainder involves a sentence of death accompanied by forfeiture
of property and corruption of the blood. Bills inflicting lesser punishment, termed "bills
of pains and penalties" are considered within article I, §10 of the Federal Constitution.
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch. (10 U.S.) 87 (1810). As to what constitutes sufficient punishment to amount to a bill of attainder, see In re Yung Sing Hee, (C.C. Ore. 1888) 36 F.
437 (Chinese exclusion act applied to citizen returning from abroad); McFarland v.
American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79, 36 S.Ct. 498 (1916) (prohibition of certain
business practices if applicable by nature only to the plaintiff); Jones v. Slick, (Fla. 1952)
56 S. (2d) 459 (city officer fined, imprisoned, or removed if found guilty of disobeying a
council order by a nvo-thirds vote of the city council). See also Gaines v. Buford, I Dana
(31 Ky.) 480 (1833); Opinion to the House of Representatives, 80 R.I. 281, 96 A. (2d)
623 (1953). For a discussion of bills of attainder in colonial America, see Thompson,
"Anti-Loyalist Legislation During the American Revolution," 3 ILL. L. R.Ev. 81 (1908).
4 Cummings v. Missouri, note 3 supra; Ex parte Garland, note 3 supra; Garner v.
Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 71 S.Ct. 909 (1951).
5 For a compilation of bill of attainder cases, see 90 L. Ed. 1267 (1946). See, generally, 63 YALE L.J. 844 (1954).
6 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946), noted in 95 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 80 (1946); 45
MICH. L. R.Ev. 98 (1946); 46 CoL. L. R.Ev. 849 (1946).
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volved a rider to a congressional appropriations act which provided that
no money made available by that act or any subsequent act was to be used
to pay the salaries of Lovett and two other executive department employees.7
The majority of the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, held
that the provision was a bill of attainder, construing the statute to bar
permanently the three employees from the government service. The Court
of Claims, in its decision in the Lovett case, stated that "a mere denial of
appropriation, however unjust it might be . . . could not successfully be
questioned . . ." but that Congress had gone further by prohibiting all
future employment by the government. 8 In the principal case, the court
distinguished the Lovett case on this basis and said that the Minnesota act
did not bar the plaintiff from all positions, but left him free to fill any
other post. Interpretations of the Lovett case by lower federal courts indicate the validity of this distinction.9 In addition, the Minnesota court
declined to find a bill of attainder in the principal case on the basis of a
lack of the requisite intent by the legislature to inflict "punishment." The
court was unwilling to resort to the sparse records of the debates and committee hearings of the Minnesota legislature nor did it feel justified in
relying on evidence of animosity between plaintiff and individual members
of the legislature.10 Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion in the
Lovett case, declined to find a bill of attainder because of the failure of the
act to contain a declaration of guilt. Like the court in the principal case,
he refused to go behind the act to investigate its motivation, declaring that
the term "bill of attainder" has a fixed meaning in the Constitution, and
that acts which deviate from the historical form of these bills are beyond
the scope of the prohibition.11 Certainly the principal case presents an
opportunity to reevaluate both the Lovett decision and the minority position that the bill of attainder concept should be restricted to its traditional
form.12
Kenneth H. Haynie
57 Stat. L. 450 (1943).
104 Ct. Cl. 557, 66 F. Supp. 142 at 149 (1945). See Washington v. Clark, (D.C. D.C.
1949) 84 F. Supp. 964, affd. sub nom. Washington v. McGrath, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F.
(2d) 375, affd. 341 U.S. 923, 71 S.Ct. 795 (1951), for the statement that there have been
many occasions where Congress has included _such riders in appropriations acts and that
those provisions had not been successfully attacked as bills of attainder.
9 Washington v. Clark, note 8 supra; Bailey v. Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F.
(2d) 46, affd. 341 U.S. 918, 71 S.Ct. 669 (1951). See also Garner v. Board of Public Works,
341 U.S. 716, 71 S.Ct. 909 (1951).
.
10 Principal case at 875-878. In United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073
(1946), the majority of the Supreme Court was willing to go to the House committee
hearings and debates to find that Congress was discharging the employees for alleged
subversive activity. The Minnesota Legislature does not have such complete records.
3.1328 U.S. 303 at 322-327, 66 S.Gt. 1073 (1946). A similar view was propounded by
Justice Miller's dissent in Ex parte Garland, note 3 supra, at 382. See Norville, "Bill of
Attainder-A Rediscovered Weapon Against Discriminatory Legislation," 26 ORE. L. REv.
78 (1947), for the suggestion that the Lovett case was incorrectly decided and that a better
ground for the decision would have been denial of due process because of the arbitrary
classification. But see 95 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 80 (1946).
12 In addition, there is some authority for suggesting that the rider might be consid7
8

